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Abstract
This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the
years of 1993 to 2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-
bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates
the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the “H statistic” by
Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have
moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The
measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly
concentrated markets. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and
Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to
reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.
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1 Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC)1 economies share a number of common
features. These economies are characterized by large oil producing sectors,
dependency on oil exports, stable currencies and stable price levels. Similarities also
extend to geography, longstanding cultural and political ties, a common language,
high living standards and coordinated policies. These similarities by far outweigh any
differences.
The last 30 years have seen significant structural change in the GCC financial
markets. In particular, policies of financial liberalization and financial restructuring
were implemented with the goal of enhancing competitiveness in the banking sector.
These policies beg the following questions: how large are the banking markets in
these six countries? What is the structure of the banking market? Is the concentration
in these markets increasing or decreasing?
Studies of competitive conditions in the developed economies banking
markets are commonplace, there have been relatively few studies conducted for the
GCC economies2 and no empirical work of a specialist nature. This paper investigates
the market structure of the GCC banking industry in the decade to 2002 with the aim
of evaluating the monopoly power of the banks over this period. The paper aims to
test the relationship between the market structure and the competitive conditions of
the banks in these six economies using the most frequently applied measures of
concentrations; namely the k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure concentration, and the H-statistic of the Panzar-
Rosse model to measure monopoly power.
                                                
1 The Arab GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE).
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The rest of the paper has the following structure: section two provides a
background to the banking system in the GCC countries. Section three discusses
measures of market structure and concentration. Section four presents the empirical
result for the competitive conditions in these markets. The final section concludes.
2 The GCC Banking Sector
The banking industry in the GCC countries is relatively young, with the oldest banks
dating back to no earlier than the 1950s. Although the majority are privately owned,
the role of the public sector remains substantial. Whether through equity participation
in several banks or through a number of governments owned specialized credit
institutions that provide financing to public and private sector enterprises at
subsidized rates, the public sector continues to have a prominent role in the banking
industry of the GCC countries. Private sector ownership of financial institutions also
tends to be concentrated in a few shareholders; a matter that reduces the threats (and
benefits) of the market for corporate control.
Considering the region’s massive oil wealth, the combined Tier One capital of
the GCC’s Top 50 banks at $31.5 billion is relatively small, amounting to 1.7% of the
capital of the Top 1000 world banks. The capital of all 50 GCC banks is considerably
less than that of HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation) Holdings at $35
billion. While GCC banks have been able to receive the highest rating of any bank in
the Arab world or the emerging markets, the GCC has not been able to produce large
powerhouse institutions that could be a force in the Arab or international banking
arena. For number of reasons, many of them political, the global trend towards
consolidation has by-passed the Gulf. However, with World Trade Organisation
(WTO) liberalisation planned for the near future, banks will be reconsidering their
                                                                                                                                           
2 Salem-Ghanem et. al. (2002) examines concentration and equates concentration with lack of
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competitive strategies. As a recent report in the Banker stated, “GCC banks need to
strengthen their position through consolidation in order to compete effectively with
international banks. The current fragmented banking sector will be unable to put up a
good fight when markets do eventually open up” (The Banker, 2002).
A key assumption in quantitative analysis of banking is that the banks
examined have to be relatively homogenous, provide similar services and use similar
resources. Commercial banks operating in GCC are depository institutions that cannot
take part in the leasing and trading of real goods for commercial purposes. In contrast,
development and investment banks can engage in such activities, but they cannot
accept deposits. These non-depository institutions also do not extend small
commercial and individual loans, which require a substantial amount of investment in
a brick-and-mortar branching network, work force, and regulatory compliance. In
fact, they are mostly single branch banks that finance large long-term projects.
Because of their small market share in the sector as well as quite different technology,
structure and goal, this study excludes development and investment banks and instead
concentrates on commercial and Islamic banks.
The data is obtained from financial statements of banks, on their web pages on
the internet, annual central bank reports, and from the Fitch-IBCA Ltd Bankscope CD
Rom. This study covers 52 banks privately held and domestically owned that are fully
licensed commercial. Table 1 below summarises the structural properties of the
individual banking sectors of each country. It shows that Saudi Arabia has the largest
banking market measured by asset size and asset concentration per bank. It also
dominates by having the largest number of branches. In contrast, Oman has a smaller
                                                                                                                                           
competitiveness.
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banking market but a higher number of banks per unit of asset and a larger number of
branches.
Table 1: The Banking Sector in the GCC in 2002
Country Banks Assets $billion Branches ∆Branches
1995-2002
Saudi Arabia 10 134 1181 347
UAE 18 62 333 78
Kuwait 7 54 176 53
Qatar 6 15 71 30
Bahrain 6 9 77 16
Oman 5 9 296 115
The sample period covers 1993-20023. The final sample consists of 484 bank-year
observations.
3 Measuring market structure
There are a number of measures of concentration that have been used in banking
studies. Hall and Tideman (1967) suggested a list of six desirable properties for
measures of concentration. These are:
1. A concentration index should be a one-dimensional measure.
2. Concentration in an industry should be independent of the size of that
industry.
3. Concentration should increase if the share of any firm is increased at the
expense of a smaller firm.
4. If all firms are divided into K equal parts then the concentration index should
be reduced by a proportion 1/K.
                                                
3 The sample period for UAE banks covers from 1995-2002.
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5. If all firms are divided into N equal parts then the concentration should be a
decreasing function of N.
6. A concentration measure should be between zero and one.
In a review of 73 US Structure-Conduct-Performance studies in banking from 1961 to
1991, Molyneux et al. (1996a) report that in 37 studies, the 3-bank deposit
concentration measure was used. The second most frequently used is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI – 18 studies) followed by the number of firms in the market.
Following the steps of previous researchers and due to the limited number of banks in
GCC, this paper will use the highest 2 &3 bank deposits as well as Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for deposits as a measure of market structure.
The theoretical links between the measures of concentration used in this paper
and market power have been explored by a number of researchers. Cowling and
Waterson (1976), Dansby and Wilig (1979) and Novshek (1980) have shown how a
Cournot oligopoly will generate equilibrium price-cost margins or Lerner indices as
function of measures of market concentration such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index. Similarly, a dominant cartel of k firms with a competitive fringe generates
equilibrium price-cost margins related to the k-firm concentration index (Saving
1970).
Both simplicity and limited data requirements make the k bank concentration
ratio one of the most frequently used measures of concentration in the empirical
literature. Summing only the market shares of the k largest banks in the market, it
takes the form:
                                                       CRk  = ∑
=
k
i
S
1
ι 
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The index gives equal emphasis to the k leading banks, but neglects the many small
banks in the market. There is no rule for the determination of the value of k, so that
the number of banks included in the concentration index is a somewhat arbitrary
decision. The concentration ratio may be considered as one point on the concentration
curve, and it is a one-dimensional measure ranging between zero and unity. The index
approaches zero for an infinite number of equally sized banks (given that the k chosen
for the calculation of the concentration ratio is comparatively small when compared to
the total number of banks) and it equals unity if the banks included in the calculation
of the concentration ratio make up the entire industry.
Since 1982, the U.S Department of Justice has based its merger guidelines on
the HHI. This measure, which is also used by bank regulatory agencies, is calculated
by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a defined geographic banking
market and then summing the squares. The HHI can range from zero in a market
having an infinite number of firms to 10,000 in a market having just one firm (with a
100 per cent market share). The HHI is a static measure and, therefore, gauges market
concentration at a single point in time. Algebraically, it is:
 HHI =  ∑
=
n
i 1
(MSi)2
where MS is the market share of the ith firm and n is number of firms in the market.
The index stresses the importance of larger banks by assigning them a greater weight
than smaller banks, and it incorporates each bank individually, so that arbitrary cut-
offs and insensitivity to the share distribution are avoided.
Based on the number of national banks in each of the six countries, we expect
that the 2-bank deposits, 3-bank deposits and HHI value for testing the market
structure in GCC markets will give indications that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE
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markets could be described as ‘unconcentrated markets’, while markets for Bahrain,
Oman and Qatar could be described as ‘concentrated markets’.
Table 2 presents the HHI and CRk for 1995 and 2002, where the total deposits
and have been taken as the measure of bank size. In general, the concentration ratio
shows the decreasing trend except for Oman. According to the current screening
guidelines in U.S.A, these results would indicate that Bahrain, Oman and Qatar
markets could be described as ‘concentrated markets’4. However, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and UAE markets could be described as ‘moderately concentrated markets’.
Table 2 Trends in Concentration in Deposit Market
Country CR2 1995 CR2 2002 CR3 1995 CR3 2002 HHI 1995 HHI 2002
Saudi
Arabia
0.38 0.38 0.54 0.51 1468 1298
UAE 0.39 0.34 0.53 0.44 1299 1064
Kuwait 0.48 0.49 0.61 0.62 1983 1897
Qatar 0.73 0.70 0.81 0.81 3996 3565
Bahrain 0.72 0.66 0.83 0.79 2738 2351
Oman 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.81 2258 2712
Source: Annual Reports
The HHI and CRk measures show that the Qatar, Oman and Bahrain banking sectors
are heavily concentrated. The natural policy concern is the welfare loss from non-
competitive pricing that could more than offset any presumed benefit associated with
                                                
4  According to the current screening guidelines in USA, the banking industry is regarded to be competitive market
if the HHI is less than 1000, somewhat concentrated market if the HHI lies between 1000 and 1800, and very
concentrated market if HHI is more than 1800. If the post merger market HHI is lower than 1,800 points and the
increase in the index from the pre-merger situation is less than 200 points, the merger is presumed to have no
anticompetitive effects and is approved by the regulators. Should those threshold values be exceeded, the
regulators will check for the existence of potential mitigating factors. If the mitigating factors are not enough to
justify the merger, the regulators may require the divestiture of some branches and offices, in order to bring the
concentration ratio to or below the threshold level. If divestiture would not accomplish this goal, the merger
application is denied. A more complete discussion of HHI is presented in Stephen A. Rhoades (1993) and Federal
Reserve Bank (1998).
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mergers or with the existence of large institutions. Other economic concerns about
concentrated markets relate to the effectiveness of central bank policy, the increased
probability of systemic risk and possible reduction in lending to the small and
medium corporations5. The view on the relationship between competition and market
structure is based on the traditional monopoly power hypothesis. According to this
hypothesis, more concentrated markets tend to be more collusive and banks earn
monopolistic profits by working with a wider margin of intermediation. These
arguments are called ‘Structural Models’ because they are based on the structure of
the banking market6 and are challenged by other theoretical approaches. In reaction to
the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural models, “Non Structural
Models” of competitive behaviour have been developed. These “New Empirical
Industrial Organization” approaches such as the Panzar and Rosse (P-R) model
measure competition and emphasize the analysis of the competitive conduct of banks
without using explicit information about the structure of the market.
This study employs the “Non-Structural Model” approach suggested by Rosse
and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987), so-called “H statistic”, which
has been widely employed in the examination of the competitive structure of the
banking industry in various countries. The method developed by Panzar and Rosse
(1987) determines the competitive behaviour of banks on the basis of the comparative
static properties of reduced-form revenue equations based on cross-section data.
Panzar and Rosse (P-R) show that if their method is to yield plausible results, banks
must also be in long-term equilibrium (i.e. the number of banks needs to be
endogenous to the model) while the performance of banks needs to be influenced by
the actions of other market participants.
                                                
5 The increased probability of systemic risk associated with concentrated markets has been formally
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De Bandt and Davis (2000) show that the P-R approach require a number of
working assumptions. First, banks must be treated as single product firms (an
assumption that is more tenable for the GCC countries than for the developed
economies). Consistent with the intermediation approach to banking, banks are
viewed as producing intermediation services using labour, physical capital, and
financial capital as inputs. Second, higher input prices must not be correlated with
higher quality services that generate higher revenues, because such a correlation
would bias the computed H statistic. This means, however, that if one rejects the
hypothesis of a contestable competitive market, this bias cannot be too large
(Molyneux et al., 1996b). Third, banks must be in long-run equilibrium.
 Studies of the banking industry have seen an increase in the application of the
Panzar-Rosse methodology7. Table 3 summarises the results of those investigations.
Most of them are for European countries and indicate that banks earn revenues as if
they are under conditions of monopolistic competition.
Table 3: P-R model results from other studies
Authors Period Countries Results
Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York monopolistic competition
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982-84 Canada 1982: perfect comp.; 1983-
84: monopolistic comp.
Lloyd-Williams et al. (1991) 1986-88 Japan monopoly
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-89 France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, UK
mon.: Italy; mon. comp.:
France, Germany, Spain, UK
Vesala (1995) 1985-92 Finland monopolistic competition for all but
two years
Molyneux et al. (1996b) 1986-88 Japan monopoly
Coccorese (1998) 1988-96 Italy monopolistic competition
Rime (1999) 1987-94 Switzerland monopolistic competition
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993-95 Greece monopolistic competition
Bikker & Groeneveld (2000) 1989-96 15 EU countries monopolistic competition
De Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992-96 France, Germany
and Italy
large banks: mon. comp. in
all countries; small banks:
mon. comp. in Italy, monopoly in
France, Germany
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 1988-98 23 OECD countries monopolistic competition
Hempell (2002) 1993-98 Germany Monopolistic competition
                                                                                                                                           
shown by Shaffer (1994)
6 Not to be confused with the notion of a 'structural model' in econometric modelling.
7 The first application was by Rosse and Panzar (1977), who employed a cross-section of data in order
to estimate the H-statistic for the newspaper firms in the local media markets.
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Coccorese (2004) 1997-99 Italy monopolistic competition
Following Shaffer (1982, 1985), Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al.
(1994) and Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), we estimate the following bank revenue
function (equation (1)) in which revenue is explained by factor prices and other bank-
specific variables8.
BRASSET
RISKASSPFPKPLTREV
lnln
lnlnlnln)ln(
65
43210
αα
ααααα
++
++++=
(1)
The revenue equation in the Panzar- Rosse model is interpreted as a reduced form
rather than a structural equation. The variables are defined as follows:
TREV The ratio of total revenue to total assets
PL Ratio of personnel expenses to employees (unit price of labour)
PK Ratio of capital expenses to fixed assets (unit price of capital)
PF Ratio of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds - deposit and
non-deposit liabilities (unit price of funds)
RISKASS Ratio of Provisions to total assets
ASSET Bank total assets
BR Ratio of number of branches of a bank to the total number of branches
per country
The H-statistic value is the sum of the factor price elasticity: PL, PK, and PF.
A value of 0≤H  implies monopoly equilibrium. That is each bank operates
independently as under monopoly profit maximisation conditions (H is a decreasing
function of the perceived demand elasticity) or perfect cartel. A value of 0 < H < 1
implies that banks operate under conditions of monopolistic competition with free
                                                
8 Molyneux et al. (1996b) found that a log linear revenue equation gave similar results as a more
flexible translog equation.. See also De Bandt and Davis (2000) for a discussion of the functional form.
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entry equilibrium (H is an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity). A
value of H = 1 is the perfect competition case with free entry equilibrium and full
efficient capacity utilisation9.
In long-run equilibrium, rates of return should be uncorrelated with input
prices. To test if the banking market is in long-run equilibrium we also estimate the
auxiliary equation (2), which tests for the equality of risk-adjusted rates of return
across banks.
BRASSET
RISKASSPFPKPLROA
lnln
lnlnlnln)1ln(
65
43210
ββ
βββββ
++
++++=+
(2)
To verify that input prices are not correlated with industry returns, we regress
the ratio return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. Because ROA can take on
small negative values, following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Utrero-Gonzalez
(2004), we compute the dependent variable as ln(1+ROA) where ROA is the
unadjusted return on assets. The long-run equilibrium test measures the sum of the
elasticity of return on assets with respect to input prices. If the E-statistic (β1+β2 +β3)
= 0, this implies that the banking market is in long-run equilibrium. If rejected, the
market is assumed not to be in equilibrium10. It should be noted that equilibrium does
not mean that competitive conditions are not allowed to change during the sample
period. It only implies that changes in banking are taken as gradual.
                                                
9 See Rosse and Panzar 1997; Panzar and Rosse 1982, 1987; Shaffer 1982, 1983; Nathan and Neave
1989. Also Coccorese (1998).
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4. Empirical results
This study covers 52 banks privately held and domestically owned that are fully
licensed commercial. The number of bank-year observations per country is 60 for
Bahrain, 70 for Kuwait, 50 for Oman, 60 for Qatar, 100 for Saudi Arabia and 144
observations for UAE. The sample frame is not dissimilar to previous studies. For
example, Nathan and Neave (1989) used samples of 39 observation on Canadian trust
companies and 33 observations on mortgage companies; and Shaffer and DiSalvo
(1994) used samples of 36 and 44 observations on duopoly banks in alternate
specifications.
The independent variables are chosen to account for firm specific and market
specific factors11. Bank specific risk is measured by the ratio of provisions to total
assets (RISKASS)12. We expect the effect of RISKASS on revenue to be positive since
higher provisions are associated with higher risk and higher expected return.  Second,
total assets, (ASSET) are included in the analysis to account for possible scale
economies13. Third, the ratio of each bank’s branches to total branches in the country,
(BR), is used as a proxy for banks’ market share. Finally, PL, PK and PF are variables
of the unit prices of the inputs of the banks: labour, capital and funds or proxies of
these prices.
The nature of estimation of the H-statistic means that we are especially
interested in understanding how total revenues react to variations in the factor prices,
PL, PK and PF. Based on the measures of HHI and CRk as shown at table 2, we
                                                                                                                                           
10 See Shaffer (1982) for the origination of this test and more recently for its application Molyneux et
al. (1996b); Hondroyiannis et al. (1999); and Claessens and Laeven 2004)
11 See Nathan and Neave, (1989), Molyneux et al., (1994), Hondroyiannis et al., 1999
12 See also Coccorese (2004)
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expect that the H values for testing the competitive conditions in the GCC are greater
than zero and less than one.  It is, therefore, hypothesised that the banks in the GCC
operate under conditions of monopolistic competition.
The empirical results for the aggregated country-pooled data are reported in
table 4.
Table 4: P-R model Aggregate results for the GCC banking market; 't' values in
parenthesis
Variable lnTREV ln(1+ROA)
Pooled Country Fixed
Effects
Pooled Country Fixed
Effects
Intercept -1.466
(-13.52)***
0.677
(2.34)**
0.0041
(1.38)
0.0430
(4.99)***
lnPK 0.0520
(2.79)***
0.0397
(2.32)**
-.0017
(-3.24)***
-.0019
(-3.75)***
lnPF 0.2002
(9.90)***
0.2417
(12.54)***
-.0018
(-3.26)***
-.0012
(-2.04)**
lnPL -.0067
(-1.43)
0.1899
(4.89)***
0.0004
(3.41)***
0.0043
(3.72)***
lnASSET -.0616
(-2.85)***
-.3507
(-8.40)***
-.0024
(-3.98)***
-.0074
(-5.95)***
lnBR -.0034
(-0.28)
0.1781
(8.28)***
0.0003
(0.84)
0.0034
(5.27)***
lnRISKASS 0.0417
(4.60)***
0.0378
(4.58)***
-.0006
(-2.43)**
-.0007
(-2.69)***
2R 0.2500 0.3900 0.0800 0.1400
H Value 0.24 a,b 0.47 a,b -
E Value - - -.0031 a 0.0012 c
F-statistic 26.32119 28.48864 7.688253 8.050013
                                                                                                                                           
13 See also De Bandt and Davis (2000), Shaffer (2002)
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S.E. of Regression 0.223765 0.200762 0.006206 0.005989
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * signifi8cant at 10%, a) significantly different from zero
on Wald F test. b) Significantly different from unity on a Wald F test. c) Not significantly different
from zero
A test for the country fixed effects specification versus pooled rejected the
pooled specification (F test for lnTREV was 22.92, and for ln(1+ROA) was 6.95 both
greater than the critical value of 2.21) . The sign on ASSETS suggests that as a whole
the banking market in the GCC faces diseconomies of scale, whereas there are
significant market share effects as suggested by the positive effect of BR on revenue
per asset. The effect of RISKAS on revenue is positive as expected and indicates that
greater risk is associated with higher revenue. On the fixed effects specification, the
banking market is shown to be in long-run equilibrium and the Rosse-Panzar H
Statistic indicates that the GCC banking market as a whole is operating under
conditions of monopolistic competition.
While there are a number of advantages of using panel methods of estimation
for the GCC as a whole, the rejection of the pooled specification raise the possibility
that the country specific differences may disguise country-bank specific and
competitive structure differences within the GCC. These potential differences are
explored by estimating Rosse-Panzar H statistics for each country banking market.
Table 5 shows the estimates of the Rosse-Panzar H statistic for each country
banking market. The auxiliary equations that indicate long-run equilibrium for each
country (not shown) confirm that the sum of the elasticities of factor prices is not
significantly different from zero. Therefore we can think of the banking sector in each
economy as being in long-run equilibrium.
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The econometric results from Table 5 are mixed14. In general, the value of the
H statistic is significantly determined except in the case of the UAE. The
disaggregated picture of competitive conditions is not consistent within the GCC. The
banking sectors in Bahrain and Qatar appear to operate in conditions of monopolistic
competition, whereas Kuwait, Saudi Arabia appears to operate in conditions of perfect
competition. Because the estimated value of H for UAE is not significantly different
from 1 (F= 0.00), the UAE banking sector is also consistent with perfect competition.
Table 5 – P-R Model for Individual Countries; 't' values in parenthesis
Variable Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Intercept
5.443
(4.97)***
1.977
(2.24)**
-3.570
(-2.48)**
-2.168
(-2.73)***
2.605
(1.68)*
0.567
(1.52)
ln PK
-0.005
(-0.14)
0.027
(1.01)
-0.217
(-1.61)
0.076
(2.03)**
0.062
(1.72)*
0.014
(0.53)
ln PF
0.234
(5.37)***
0.549
(13.27)***
0.050
(0.60)
0.406
(10.98)***
0.326
(10.32)***
0.271
(6.58)***
ln PL
0.472
(3.9741)***
0.468
(5.0686)***
-0.011
(-0.0830)
0.146
(1.9285)*
0.616
(4.3951)***
0.747
(1.0425)
ln ASSET
-0.622
(-6.17)***
-0.125
(-1.66)*
0.0279
(0.40)
0.117
(1.80)*
-0.244
(-2.29)**
-0.170
(-5.13)***
ln BR
0.826
(3.64)***
-0.050
(-0.34)
-0.192
(-1.47)
-0.082
(-0.99)
0.135
(0.72)
0.201
(4.31)***
ln RISKASS
-0.010
(-0.50)
0.006
(0.60)
0.051
(2.16)**
0.031
(1.92)*
0.013
(0.88)
0.039
(2.09)**
H-Value 0.70 1.02 -0.18 0.63 1.00 1.04
F test H=0 34.8*** 111.5*** 0.92 78.5 *** 59.1*** 2.03
F test H=1 6.31** 0.20 40.5 *** 27.3 *** 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 0.84 0.83 0.74 0.85 0.71 0.44
                                                
14 We also test for a delayed effect of input prices on revenue caused by the possibility of fixed rate
loans of greater than one-year maturity. A dynamic version of equation (1) is estimated with one-year
lags of input prices. The results are presented and discussed in the Appendix. We are grateful to an
anonymous referee for suggesting this exploration.
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Competitive
condition
Monopolistic
competition
Perfect
competition Undetermined
Monopolistic
competition
Perfect
competition
Perfect
competition
F-statistic 28.03305 27.45107 14.74449 29.00449 16.41724 19.80558
S.E. of Reg. 0.143286 0.063344 0.145660 0.075831 0.081207 0.231624
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. All countries estimated with fixed banks effects except
UAE which is pooled (reject fixed effects)
However, this interpretation is subject to the caveat that the value of H for
UAE is not estimated with high precision. The estimated value of H for Oman is not
significantly different from zero or, by continuity, from some small positive number;
we cannot reject the hypothesis of monopolistic competition for the Oman banking
industry. Thus, the result of Oman should be considered “undetermined” rather than
“monopoly”.
The sign of the RISKASS variable is positive and statistically significant in the
case of Oman, Qatar and UAE (Qatar at the 10% level of significance). This indicates
that banks that have riskier positions have higher rewards as measured by higher
revenues per currency of assets.  The coefficient on the value of assets (ASSET) is
negative and significant in the case of Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia, implying that
larger banks seem to be less revenue efficient compared with smaller banks. The
coefficient on the variable relating to size effects in terms of branches, BR, is positive
and significant for Bahrain and UAE, suggesting that a greater number of a bank’s
branches give higher total revenue. This indicates that Bahrain, and UAE are not over
branched and might have a scope of branch expansion.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the market structure of GCC banking industry during the
periods of 1993-2002 and evaluates the monopoly power of banks.  To our
18
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knowledge, no econometric analysis of competitive conditions of banking in the GCC
economies has been conducted before. Our investigation suggests that there is some
merit to examining the banks of the GCC countries as an aggregate. In total the GCC
banking system can be thought of as operating under conditions of monopolistic
competition. However, there is considerable variation within each economy.
The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have unconcentrated
markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The P-R results suggest a
mixed bag of competitive, monopolistic competition and monopoly within the GCC
economies. The finding of perfect competition in the case of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
(and possibly UAE if the value of H is taken as 1) coincide with the results of
measures of concentration CRk and HHI as shown in table 2.  This could be explained
by either the presence of the foreign banks in these countries as well as the
preparation of these three countries for entering in WTO and the implications of
‘threat of entry’. The H-statistics is 0.70 and 0.63 for Bahrain and Qatar, indicating
that the banks in these two countries earn their revenue under monopolistic
competition. The H-statistics is -0.18 for Oman, indicating that the banks in Oman
earned their revenue under monopoly conditions. Our findings suggest that except in
the case of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the banking market in the rest of the GCC has
yet some way to go in developing a competitive structure if it is to face the forces of
global banking competition.
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APPENDIX - Dynamic P-R Model
This appendix reports the results of a dynamic version of equation (1) for each
country described as:
ititititit
itititititit
uBRASSETRISKASSPF
PKPLPFPKPLTREV
+++++
+++++=
−
−−
lnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnln)ln(
6541
12113210
ααα
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The variables are as described in the text, 'i' represents the bank in each country, 't'
represents time, and u is a random term. The H statistic is calculated as the sum of the
input price elasticities given by:
321321 δδδααα +++++=H
Similarly the long-run equilibrium equation  (2) was modified in the same way as
above and described below, where ε  is a random term..
ititititit
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The long-run equilibrium test is given as:
0321321 =+++++= δδδαααE
Table A1 presents the results for the revenue function. The last row of the table shows
that the long-run equilibrium condition was satisfied for each country on a Wald F
test. The computed H statistics did not alter the results regarding the competitive
condition of each banking market shown in Table 5. In most cases the additional lags
of input prices were statistically insignificant, except for Saudi Arabia.
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Table A1 – P-R Model for Individual Countries; 't' values in parenthesis
Variable Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Intercept
2.955
(2.93)***
1.827
(1.89)*
-2.348
(-1.66)**
-1.426
(-1.88)*
1.689
(1.79)*
-0.390
(-1.13)
ln PK
-0.010
(-0.19)
0.012
(0.42)
-0.238
(-1.72)*
0.082
(1.75)*
0.070
(2.01)**
0.023
(0.48)
ln PK(-1)
0.006
(0.09)
0.022
(0.80)
-0.029
(-0.21)
-0.012
(-0.28)
0.050
(1.39)
0.029
(0.59)
ln PF
0.141
(2.77)***
0.525
(7.30)***
0.231
(1.26)
0.393
(4.28)***
0.459
(6.792)***
0.425
(3.61)***
ln PF(-1)
0.029
(0.68)
-0.006
(-0.14)
-0.027
(-0.23)
0.014
(0.24)
-0.089
(-2.41)**
-0.002
(-0.03)
ln PL
0.488
(3.92)***
0.290
(2.37)**
0.025
(0.15)
0.070
(0.48)
0.257
(1.66)*
1.048
(0.92)
ln PL(-1)
-0.159
(-1.22)
-0.016
(-0.32)
0.113
(0.74)
0.140
(0.85)
0.371
(2.49)**
-0.287
(-0.25)
ln ASSET
-1.971
(-8.27)***
-0.652
(-2.38)**
0.233
(0.66)
0.349
(1.45)
-0.852
(-2.98)***
-0.326
(-4.00)***
ln BR
1.033
(6.78)***
0.275
(2.21)**
-0.294
(-1.74)*
-0.084
(-0.99)
0.376
(1.89)*
0.162
(3.24)***
ln RISKASS
0.011
(0.61)
0.008
(0.68)
0.052
(1.60)
0.038
(2.17)**
0.013
(0.96)
0.028
(1.39)
H-Value 0.49 0.83 0.07 0.69 1.12 1.24
F test H=0 12.46*** 36.24*** 0.09 44.69 *** 60.74*** 0.45
F test H=1 13.01*** 1.58 13.34*** 9.26 *** 0.68 0.02
Adj. R2 0.92 0.72 0.32 0.77 0.75 0.20
Competitive
condition
Monopolistic
competition
Perfect
competition Undetermined
Monopolistic
competition
Perfect
competition
Perfect
competition
F test lags = 0 0.60 0.07 0.07 0.77 4.94** 0.00
F test E = 0 0.01 1.03 0.36 0.01 0.54 1.01
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*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. All countries estimated with fixed banks effects except
UAE which is pooled (reject fixed effects)
A variable deletion test on the additional lags of input was rejected for Saudi Arabia
on a conventional 'F' test (second last row of Table A1).  The lag of the unit price of
labour and unit price of funds were both statistically significant at the conventional
level. The sum of the elasticities of the current and lagged unit price of labour is
similar to that of the partial elasticity on the unit price of labour shown in Table 5,
suggesting a distributive effect over a two-year period. The negative and significant
coefficient on the lag of the unit price of funds suggests that in the case of Saudi
Arabia there is a dynamic effect that indicates the presence of fixed-rate loans of
greater than one-year maturity. All other variables have a similar effect on revenue as
in Table 5. Importantly, Table A1 does not alter the conclusion of the state of the
banking market in each country as given in Table 5.
